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CASE NO. 7468 
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BINGHAM, in his own right, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF OGDEN CITY, 
A public corporation, 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MARIL \~N BINGH.A.l\I, an infant by JACK T. 
BINGH..t\M, her guardian ad litem, and JACK T. 
BINGHAl\1, in his own right, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EDtrC.t\TION OF OGDEN CITY, 
a public corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
The respondent is satisfied that the law issues in this 
case have been fully and completely decided against the 
appellants by this Honorable Court in the case of Niblock 
vs. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah, page 573, 111 P. 2nd 800. 
Justice Wolfe, who, I understand from reading his opin~ 
ions, does not agree with the full scope of the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, states in the last sentence of his opinion 
in the Niblock as as follows: 
"However, since the decisions of this court have stead-
fastly refused to so limit the doctrine, the prevailing rule 
must continue to be the law until the Legislature sees fit to 
change it." 
Justice McDonough says at page 577: 
"This court is committed to the doctrine that the duly 
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to repair or construct streets within its corporate limits is 
a governmental one and that in the absence of a statute no 
liability devolves on a municipality for the defective condition 
of its streets." 
That on page 581 Justice Me Donough says: 
"That a statute imposing liability for injuries resulting 
from defects or dangerous conditions in the way does not 
authorize recovery by one injured through the. negligent 
operation of a vehicle or machine by one engaged in repair 
of a highway is the holding of a majority of the court." 
Supporting said doctrine, if it needs any support, is the 
following paragraph from the voluminous note from 160 
A.L.R., at page 23, being the last paragraph on said page 
in which the annotator writes: 
"Nevertheless, even assuming that the general rule of 
immunity is arbitrary, harsh and unjust in requiring the in-
dividual alone to bear an injury,~ and that society, in keeping 
with the modern trend, should afford relief, the courts gener-
ally have taken the view that it is for the legislature and not 
the courts to abrogate or change the rule." 
As stated by the annotator under the sub-paragraph, 
Summary, page: 20 of said note: 
"In the United States, public education, including that 
of elementary, high school, or college grade, is universally 
recognized as a public or governmental function of the state. 
The rule is well settled that the state, unless it has assumed 
such liability by constitutional mandate or legislative enact-
ment, is generally immune from tort liability because of its 
sovereign character''. 
In each and every case where this question is discussed 
by our courts it is assumed and decided that local Boards of 
Education are engaged in a governmental function. 
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In 1923 the Legislature of the State of California passed 
the following enactment the same being Section 2, Chapter 
328 of the Statutes of 1923: 
"Counties, municipalities and school districts shall be 
liable for injuries to persons and property resulting from the 
dangerous or defective condition of public streets, highways, 
buildings, grounds, works and property in all cases where 
the governing or managing board of such county, munici-
pality, school district, or other board, officer or person having 
authority to remedy such condition, had knowledge or notice 
of the street highway, building, grounds, works, or property 
and failed or neglected for a reasonable time after acquiring 
such knowledge or receiving such notice, to remedy such 
condition or failed and neglected for a reasonable time after 
acquiring such knowledge or receiving such notice to take 
such action as may be reasonably necessary to protect the 
public against such dangerous or defective condition." 
The decisions of the Supreme Court of California are, 
therefore, based upon the application and the interpertation 
of that statute. 
I desire to call the court's attention; to the following case: 
Antin vs. Union High School District, (an Oregon case) 
280 Pac. 664, 66 A.L.R. 1271. 
In 66 A. L. R., page 1274, the court says: 
"Under the statue No. 357, 358, Oregon Laws, a school 
district may sue and may be sued, and an action may be main-
tained against a school district 'for an injury to the rights of 
the rights of the plaintiff arising from some act or omission' 
of the district. Oregon Laws No.358. If this were a case 
of first impression, and there were no controlling d~cisions 
upon this question, we would be inclined to hold--at least, 
such is the opinion of the writer--that the Legislature intended 
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by the enactment of these two sections to make a school 
district liable for the consequences of its own wrongful or 
negligent acts, although not liable for the misfeasance or 
nonfeasance of its officers or agents; and such was the 
effect of the holding in McCalla vs. Multnomah County, 
3 Oregon 424, when the statute as then in force, now No.358, 
Oregon Laws, embraced not only incorporated towns, school 
districts, and other public corporations of like character but 
also counties. But this statute has been too often construed 
by this court, and held not to include within its purview an 
injury ;arising from some public or governmental act of 
public corporation, to be now open to question in respect to 
the nonliability of a public corporation for an injury arising 
from the performance of it of a public or governmental act. 
(case cited)" 
For an extensive discussion of this g.eneral question, see 
that portion of the note in 160 A. L. R. commencing at page 
85, under the sub-head of Effect of Legislative or Consti-
tutional Enactments. 
It is the contention of the respondent first, that it was 
not guilty of any negligence in the manner of its maintanence 
and operation of the so-called incinerator and that said in-
cinerator in the manner of its maintanence and operation 
did not constitute a nuisance and that it could not expect 
that a baby two years of age would fall off its tricycle at 
or near the incinerator and thereby become injured. 
The Board of Education is a public corporation and it 
can not and does not fence off its school grounds so that 
small children may not at times come upon the school grounds. 
But that is not the full test. The test ·in this case is whether 
• I 
or not the defendant was under duty to anticipate a baby 
upon a tricycle falling into the hot embers of this incinerator. 
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Such like incinerators had been maintained on all the 
school grounds for 1nany years and nobody had been hurt. 
This, of course, is a very unfortunate accident. 
In closing I would like to call the Court's attention to 
the allegations of the con1plaint .. \t no place in the complaint 
is the word "negligence" used. It seems remarkable that a 
complaint grounded on negligence should have failed to use 
that discriptive word. 
! I am quite sure that counsel for appellants were afraid 
to use that word. But whether or not they used that word, 
the basis of the appellants purported cause of action, if any 
exists, is founded upon negligence. 
It is therefore contented by the respondent that the 
demurrer was properly sustained and the complaint properly 
dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WADE M. JOHNSON 
1010 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT. 
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